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We relax the assumption of constancy of the marginal utility of income into a structural
model of urban transportation with endogenous congestion. We examine the impact of
unobserved heterogeneity in Marginal Utility (MU) of income on the determinants of travel
by estimating the model using household survey data. We show that the value of time is no
more statistically different across time slots and that the model is robust to all other results.
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The objective of the present note is to test the constancy of the MU of income in
the estimation of urban transportation demand with endogenous congestion. The
decision of traveling is modeled as a Bayesian game, in which travelers impose ex-
ternalities on one another and possess private information about their own aversion
to traﬃc congestion. We assume that the traveler has a private knowledge of his
MU of income and that it is proportional to his tolerance to traﬃc. In agreement
with the literature stating that marginal utility of income decreases with income, we
assume that higher income individuals are less constrained by traveling schedules
than lower income individuals (See Frisch (1964), and Clark (1973) for empirical
measures of MU of income in transportation).
Under the assumption of constant MU of income, Viauroux (2007) showed that
the individual value of time in traﬃc is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between peak and oﬀ-
peak periods with an estimated valuation of .769 during peak period
1against .7213
during oﬀ-peak period (and an t-test statistic of -22.18). We show that introducing
unobserved heterogeneity in the MU of income results in a constant average aversion
to traﬃc congestion across time slots. Consequently, the diﬀerence in aversion
between periods is only explained by diﬀerences in the cost of transportation usage.
2. Framework
This section introduces the transportation demand model. The idea is that poli-
cies (such as tax or fare increases) aﬀects individual decisions of traveling and these
decision in aggregate change economic variables such as traﬃc congestion, which
aﬀect individual decisions again. Hence, the individual preference for traveling de-
pends on the anticipated level of congestion, which in turn is determined by the
travel decisions of all individuals.
We let θi index individual i value of traveling, and refer to θi as individual i’s
“type” (for i = 1,...,I). Here θi ∈ Θi = Θ = [θ,θ], where θ is a taste parameter
indexing the least tolerance (greatest aversion) for congestion while θ represents
the greatest tolerance (lowest aversion) for the externalities. We denote by pi the
ex-ante probability that individual i’s type is θi, and we assume it has a probability
density function f(θi).
We also write
θ = (θi,θ−i) ∈ Θi × Θ−i with Θ−i := ×
j∈I−i
Θj.
Let pi(θ−i|θi) denote the subjective probability that i would assign to the event
that θ−i ∈ Θ−i is the actual proﬁle of types for the others, if his own type were θi.
We assume that the probabilities pi are independent, so that the density function
of pi(θ−i|θi) is given by
Q
j6=i fj(θj).
Let qi = (qc
i,qb
i) ∈ Q denote the number of trips made by individual i where qc
i
is the number of car trips creating congestion, while qb
i is the number of bus trips
that does not create externalities.
1 The peak period refers to individuals departing between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. or between
4:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.
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Travelers’ utility functions are of the form
ui(q,θ,νi) = αqc
i[1 + ψc
i + lnθi − lns−i − lnqc
i]
+ (1 − α)qb
i[1 + ψb
i + lnθi − lns−i − lnqb
i] + h(θi)νi
of Hanemann (1984), where s−i is the average number of automobile trips made
by individuals other than i, ψc
i (respectively ψb
i) denotes a measure of comfort of
traveling by car (resp. by bus) for individual i, νi gives the amount of composite
good consumed by i, α (respectively 1−α) represents the marginal utility of using
the car (respectively the bus) and the marginal utility of income h(θi) is a function
of θi.







i + pννi ≤ wi,
where pc
i (respectively pb
i) denotes the car and bus unit price, ac
i (respectively
ab
i) denotes the ﬁxed charges associated to car and bus use, pν is the unit price
associated with the composite good νi (normalized to 1) and wi is the individual
endowment. Assuming that the number I of individuals is suﬃciently large, we
have the following
Proposition 1. The maximization of ui(·) under the budget constraint gives the







































Proof. : See Appendix 1. 
Note that when θ is common knowledge, qc∗
i (θi) and qb∗


















Finally, one can write the indirect utility function of individual i as
Vi(wi − ai,pc,pb
i,θ) = αqc∗
i (θ) + (1 − α)qb∗
i (θ) + h(θi)(wi − ai), (1)
where ai = ac
i + ab
i.
3. Data and Estimation
We use a household survey in the greater Montpellier area (south of France;
229,055 inhabitants) recording the transportation activity of 6341 individuals on a
two days period. A trip is seen as a more-than-300-meters drive or run between
two places on a public road. We focus on trips made for the purposes of work,
school, shopping, leisure, returns home are not accounted for. We use a maximum
likelihood estimation method. The observed number of trips is assumed to follow a3
Poisson distribution, the expectation of which is the equilibrium conditional number
of trips at the Nash equilibrium above (for a given mode of transportation). We use
as average cost of the car, the price per kilometer times distance Origin-Destination.
Bus fares vary by type and according to travelers’socioeconomic characteristics.
They include the unit ticket: FF7 (1.07 euros), a booklet of three tickets: FF20
(3.05 euros), a booklet of 10 tickets (discounted for handicapped or large families),
a 30 days lump sum (discounted for students, non students-employed, unemployed,
scholars depending on district subventions, retired with and without no ”Carte
Or” subscription) an annual lump sum (discounted for scholars and students, un-
employed non students-scholars). Hence, each traveler i possesses the following
mutually exclusive choices: he uses neither the car nor the bus (using another
mode of transportation);
Vi(θ) = h(θ)wi;
he uses at least once the car but never the bus;
V c







α + h(θ)(wi − ac
i);
he does not use the car but he uses at least once the bus; then he can choose among
J payment option for the bus (J cases in total);
V
bj








1−α + h(θ)(θ)(wi − a
bj
i ), j = 1,...,J;
he uses both the car and the bus at least once; then he can choose again among J
payment option for the bus (J cases in total).
V
cbj















1−α + h(wi − ac
i − a
bj
i ), j = 1,...,J.
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood where the likelihood function is
the joint probability of doing a number of trips and choosing a mode of payment.
It is decomposed into a probability of making a certain number of trips conditional
on making trips with that mode of transportation and payment times the marginal
probability of choosing that mode of transportation and mode of payment. The
ﬁrst probability is chosen to be a normalized Poisson distribution while the second
is a multinomial logit. The likelihood functions are reported in Appendix 2. We
assume that h(θi) = hθi, that is, the more tolerant to traﬃc congestion, the more
an individual uses transportation despite traﬃc conditions and the higher the mar-







i are vectors characterizing the trip such as the
time between the Origin and the Destination (O-D) as well as socioeconomic char-











j0=1,..J0 where J and J0 are the numbers of
variables introduced to respectively characterize car and bus trips.
Estimation results are presented in Appendix 3. They show that the estimated
average aversion to traﬃc congestion ( 1
1.1980 = 0.8347) is low and no more diﬀerent
across time slots as this diﬀerence is accounted for by the MU of income function.
Under the assumption of a constant MU of income, Viauroux’s (2007) estimation
results showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the average aversion to congestion between
peak and oﬀ-peak periods. Allowing the MU of income to depend on aversion to
congestion results in a constant average aversion. Consequently, the diﬀerence in
aversion between periods is only explained by diﬀerences in the cost of transporta-
tion usage. The other results remain robust. The higher the bus frequency, the
more the individual travels by bus and the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger during4
oﬀ-peak time. As the distance from the Origin to the Destination increases, in-
dividuals travel more by bus and less by car, while both modes are used during
oﬀ-peak times. Scholars and unemployed travel more by bus for all times.
4. Conclusion
We show that the Bayesian approach used to model the endogeneity of the
congestion process in urban areas is robust to the relaxation of the assumption
on the constancy of the marginal utility of income. The only diﬀerence is in the
diﬀerence in aversion to traﬃc congestion found similar across periods.
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1











+ (1 − α)

1 + ψb











This deﬁnition leads to a pure multistrategy equilibrium corresponding to the value
of qi(θ) which maximizes ui(qi,q∗
−i,θ). In order to simplify the computation, let
us admit that the variable qi(θ) can be changed continuously, and let us write
down the ﬁrst order conditions associated to the above maximization. Both partial
derivatives with respect to qc
i and qb


















i = 0. (3)
Solving for qc∗
i and qb∗
























In order to determine the value of s∗
−i, integrate both parts of (4) with respect



























Assuming that one individual is negligible in the continuum of individuals so
that s∗
−i = s∗













In the case of complete information the proof remains the same, except the deter-













To obtain the expression of the indirect utility function, let us rewrite the equalities
(2) and (3) in the form
1 + ψc
i + lnθi − lns∗
−i − lnqc∗






i + lnθi − lns∗
−i − lnqb∗










= [α + h(θi)pc
i]qc∗
i (θ) + [1 − α + h(θi)pb
i]qb∗
i (θ)
+ h(θi)[wi − ac
i − pc
iqc∗





i (θ) + (1 − α)qb∗




Appendix 2. Expression of the likelihood function
Let l
cbj
ikn denote the contribution to the likelihood in case of k car trips and n bus
trips by using the mode of payment j to take the bus if n > 0. It is the product of the
probability to observe qc∗
i car trips and/or qb∗
i bus trips by the logistic probability
to choose the car and/or bus modes of transportation. The probability of making
qb∗
i or qb∗
i trips follows a Poisson distribution. Then the unconditional likelihood


















































































k,n = 1,2,..., j = 1,...,J,
where













Note that the structure of the likelihood is highly nonlinear in h(θi). Our ex-
pression of the likelihood is sensibly diﬀerent from constant MU of income case.7
Appendix 3. Estimation results
Table 1: Estimation Results
Variable Parameter θ →Beta(1,µ) Comparison
Peak Oﬀ-Peak t-test
Marginal Utility Transport α 0.7726 (0.0097) 0.8355 (0.0069) -5.2840354
Private information µ 0.1980 (0.0008) 0.1981 (0.0009) -0.083045480
Slope of MU income h 3.4928 (0.1367) 3.8937 (0.1630) -1.8845102
Bus 1 βb
1 1.8035 (0.1356) 0.1363 (0.1753) 7.5226316
Bus Frequency βb
2 0.0719 (0.0143) 0.1659 (0.0219) -3.5939171
Distance O-D βb
3 -0.0031 (0.0128) 0.1030 (0.0180) -4.8037089
Time O-D βb
4 0.0042 (0.0007) -0.005 (0.0018) 4.7635794
Student-Scholar βb
5 0.0824 (0.0769) 0.1623 (0.1313) -0.52509796
Car 1 βc
1 1.3895 (0.1795) 0.4428 (0.2221) 3.3151559
Distance O-D βc
2 0.1137 (0.0084) 0.1394 (0.0127) -1.6878334
Time O-D βc
3 0.0008 (0.0004) -0.005 (0.0018) 3.1454916
Power of the car βc
4 0.0231 (0.0066) 0.0449 (0.0104) -1.7698444
Unemployed βc
5 -0.2294 (0.0963) -0.2373 (0.0765) 0.064234139
Student-Scholar βc
6 -0.4005 (0.0957) -0.4261 (0.1280) 0.16018002
Age βc
7 0.0528 (0.0087) 0.0313 (0.0096) 1.6595020
Age*age βc
8 -0.0006 (0.0001) -0.0004 (0.0001) -1.4142136
Adj. (Mean Log L.) -6.98321 -6.07535
Standard Deviations in parentheses.